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Are lifecycle funds appropriate as default options in participant-directed 
retirement plans? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The appropriateness of default investment options in participant-directed retirement 
plans like 401(k) has been in sharp focus given that most participants fail to nominate an 
investment option to direct their contributions. In United States (US), prior to the Pension 
Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, plan fiduciaries often selected a money market fund as the 
default option. Whilst this ‘low risk and low return’ investment option was considered to be a 
‘safe’ choice by many fiduciaries who were fearful of litigation risk, it was heavily criticized 
for resulting in inadequate wealth at retirement, particularly when retirees were living much 
longer and facing inflation risk (see, for example, Viceira, 2008; Skinner, 2009).  
 The PPA directed the Department of Labor to enact a regulation to assist employers in 
choosing default investments that best serve the retirement needs of employees who do not 
direct their own investments. The regulation promulgated in 2007 has provided for protection 
of fiduciaries in selecting default options as long as these options follow a prescribed set of 
investment choices known as the ‘Qualified Default Investment Alternatives (QDIA). Of 
particular interest is the inclusion of lifecycle or target date funds as a QDIA. These funds 
have a high allocation to risky assets (like stocks) when the participant is young but gradually 
switch to less volatile, debt securities (like bonds and bills) as the retirement date approaches 
with the aim to reduce uncertainty in retirement outcomes (Viceira, 2008). Lifecycle funds 
have been, by far, the most popular QDIA chosen by plan fiduciaries. According to a recent 
report, 9 out of every 10 plans with automatic enrolment administered by Vanguard, one of 
the largest retirement plan asset managers in US, now use a lifecycle fund as their default 
option (Vanguard, 2013). In this paper, we examine the appropriateness of the fiduciary 
decision to choose lifecycle fund as default option for their plans. 
 The prime motivation behind instituting retirement savings plans is to generate 
adequate income for employees in retirement. The greatest risk for the participants, therefore, 
is that their retirement nest egg would be insufficient to sustain a basic standard of living. The 
suitability of the default option should then be assessed in terms of its ability to generate a 
minimum level of wealth to fund their basic needs. As the most popular QDIA among 
fiduciaries, one would expect lifecycle funds to be superior to other investment options in 
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meeting this standard. Yet serious concerns have been raised by some economists who argue 
that by investing in ‘high risk and high return’ growth assets in younger years, when workers 
typically make smaller contributions to their retirements accounts, and shifting assets towards 
‘low risk and low return’ investments in older years, when contributions are typically large, 
lifecycle funds risk participants accumulating less than what they need to support a decent 
retirement lifestyle (see, for example, Shiller, 2005).  
 In evaluating the appropriateness of the lifecycle fund as a default option, we compare 
it with three other alternatives in terms of generating a threshold level of wealth for 
participants at the point of retirement. Two of these alternatives, the balanced fund and the 
money market fund, are among QDIAs specified under the regulation. A balanced fund 
invests in a diversified portfolio of equities, bonds, and bills in a constant proportion 
throughout the employee’s working life i.e. in contrast to lifecycle fund, the asset allocation 
is static. A money market fund invests in short term debt securities like Treasury bills.1 The 
third alternative we use is a modified version of lifecycle fund discussed in Basu, Byrne, and 
Drew (2011).  We call this the dynamic fund where, unlike conventional lifecycle funds, the 
switching from equities to bonds and bills is not unconditional but depends on whether the 
portfolio is ahead (or short) of a target rate of return set by the participant. The intuition 
behind this switching principle is that the fund can afford to switch to conservative assets if 
the accumulation is well above the participant’s accumulation target. On the other hand, if the 
fund falls behind the target, the exposure to growth assets is maintained for a longer period. 
 
2. Results 
 
 In comparing lifecycle funds to its alternatives, we simulate retirement wealth 
outcomes for a hypothetical employee participant who joins the plan with starting salary of 
$25,000. We assume that the earnings grow linearly at the rate of 4% per year over the next 
40 years, the duration of the employee’s working life. Throughout this period, regular annual 
contributions amounting to 9% of earnings go into the retirement plan account.2 In comparing 
the alternative investment choices as default options, we are particularly interested to assess 
their ability to provide a minimum threshold level of wealth for sustenance. We use four 
                                                 
1 The regulation terms this as a ‘capital preservation product’ that could be used for only the first 120 days of 
participation.  
2 Munnell and Sunden (2006) suggest that the typical contribution rate for a 401(k) plan member, including 
employer match, is 9%. We assume that the contributions are credited annually to the member’s account at the 
end of each year. This means that the first contribution by the member is made at the end of the first year 
followed by 39 more contributions in as many years. No contribution is made in the final year of employment. 
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different thresholds: $300,000, $500,000, $700,000 and $900,000. Whilst at first glance some 
of the higher thresholds might appear excessive for purpose of sustenance, one has to 
consider that these amounts are realizable after 40 years. They equate to only $78,759, 
$131,265, $183,771 and $236,277 respectively in terms of today’s dollars.3  
 Both the lifecycle fund and the dynamic fund initially invest in a 100% stock portfolio 
until they commence switching to bonds and cash. The switching starts when the employee is 
20 years from retirement. This is consistent with the switching principle of most lifecycle 
funds currently used by retirement plans. For the lifecycle fund, the switching is 
unconditional and unidirectional where allocations are linearly shifted from stocks to bonds 
and bills over 20 years in such a proportion that only 40% of the portfolio is invested in 
stocks at the point of retirement. For the dynamic fund, however, switching is conditional to 
how the portfolio has performed relative to the investor’s accumulation objective, which we 
set at 10% rate of return compounded annually.4 If the value of the portfolio at any point is 
found to equal or exceed the investor’s target return, the portfolio partly switches to bonds 
and cash. 5  Otherwise, it remains invested in stocks. The balanced fund has a constant 
allocation to stocks, bonds, and bills in the ratio of 60:30:10 whilst the money market fund 
always invests in a 100% bills portfolio. 
 To simulate investment returns for the funds, we use the updated dataset of nominal 
returns for US stocks, bonds, and bills originally compiled by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 
(2002) that spans a period of 112 years (1900-2011). We randomly resample return vectors 
with replacement from this empirical return distribution to generate asset class return vectors 
for each year of the 40 year investment horizon and repeat the procedure for 10,000 times.6 
The simulated returns paths are then applied to the four funds to arrive at 10,000 retirement 
wealth estimates for each of them. Table 1 reports some key statistics from the distribution of 
retirement wealth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The nominal dollar amounts are adjusted using the long-term average inflation rate of 3.4% in US between 
1913 and 2008. 
4 This is close to the average return on stock market over the entire sample period. 
5 Following Basu, Byrne, and Drew (2011), we switch 20% (40%) of assets to bonds and cash between 21st and 
30th (31st and 40th) years respectively.  
6 We draw return vectors from the matrix of returns to ensure that the historical contemporary correlation 
structure between stocks, bonds, and bills are preserved. 
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Table 1 
Simulated Wealth Outcomes for Alternative Investment Choices (rounded to nearest dollar) 
Fund Simulated Wealth at Retirement Age (After 40 Years) 
 
Percentiles of Distribution 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 1 5 10 25 
Money 
Market 443,196 439,747 44,212 355,655 376,723 389,361 412,087 
        
Lifecycle 1,500,142 1,227,064 1,043,320 347,368 474,152 580,261 813,484 
    
Balanced 1,227,857 1,109,191 569,979 404,884 550,296 641,673 829,469 
    
Dynamic 1,852,832 1,634,115 1,349,226 246,750 397,946 544,150 929,931 
 
The mean and the median wealth outcomes for the money market funds are far less 
than the other funds. These low estimates are unsurprising and demonstrate why money 
market funds have been viewed as inappropriate default option vehicles by most experts. The 
corresponding estimates for the lifecycle fund are lower than those for the dynamic fund but 
ahead of those for the balanced fund. The balanced fund, however, offers more certainty in 
retirement outcomes as evident from its lower standard deviation relative to the other funds 
(except money market). However, since we are more concerned about the default fund’s 
ability to generate a minimum level of wealth for sustenance we focus on the lower 
percentiles of the terminal wealth distribution. The 1st, 5th and 10th percentile wealth estimates 
for the balanced funds are higher than the corresponding estimates of the other funds. When 
comparing the 25th percentile estimates, the dynamic fund results in the highest wealth 
followed by the balanced fund.  
 To rank the alternative choices that take into account investor’s preference on the 
trade off between risk and return, we employ a utility-of-terminal wealth approach described 
in Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise (2006). However, since we argue that the participant’s 
utmost concern is that her retirement wealth would be able to provide a minimum amount 
required for sustenance, we use a different utility measure that accounts for a threshold level 
of wealth. This utility of wealth at retirement takes the form of  
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where W  is wealth,   is the relative risk aversion parameter, h  is the loss aversion 
parameter and K  is the threshold wealth for sustenance. This utility function is consistent 
with prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where agents frame choices in terms 
of gains and losses relative to a set point of reference and the utility function is concave on 
the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. If the retirement wealth is above 
threshold wealth level, the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility applies. However, if 
the retirement wealth falls below the threshold, the CRRA utility is adjusted by the loss 
aversion parameter h  to allow for steeper convexity as a result of the participant heavily 
penalizing such outcomes.  
 For our hypothetical participant, each return path i  gives a corresponding utility level 
( )iU W  which is used to derive the probability weighted expected utility 
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
  , (2) 
where N  is the number of simulated return paths. Based on 10,000 simulations, the expected 
utilities from different strategies are compared and ranked in Table 2. Although we test for a 
range of risk aversion parameters (from γ = 2 to 15), we only present results for γ = 2, 3, 5, 
and 8 as the rankings remain the same beyond γ = 8. Similarly, we find the results to be 
robust for any value of loss aversion parameter (h) between 1 and 10.  
 
Table 2 
Rankings of Funds based on Utility of Terminal Wealth. 
 
Risk Aversion 
Parameter 
 
Sustenance Threshold ($) 
0      300,000 500,000      700,000 900,000 
γ = 2 
 
Dynamic, 
Lifecycle, 
Balanced, 
Money Market 
 
 
Money Market, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic 
 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Money market 
Balanced, 
Dynamic, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
Dynamic, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
γ = 3 
 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Money Market 
 
Money Market, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Money market 
Balanced, 
Dynamic, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
Dynamic, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
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γ = 5 
 
Money Market, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Balanced 
 
 
Money Market, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic 
 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Money Market 
Balanced, 
Dynamic, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
Dynamic, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
γ = 8 
 
Money Market, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Balanced 
 
 
Money Market, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic 
 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Dynamic, 
Money market 
Balanced, 
Dynamic, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
Dynamic, 
Balanced, 
Lifecycle, 
Money market 
 
 
 For the threshold of $300,000, the money market fund ranks ahead of the other funds. 
This is not unexpected given the threshold is extremely low (lower than the 1st percentile 
outcome for all funds except the dynamic fund) and the money market fund surpasses this 
hurdle with slightly greater certainty. The balanced fund ranks second followed by the 
lifecycle and the dynamic funds respectively. Once the thresholds are raised higher however, 
the money market fund quickly reverts to the last position indicating its inferiority as the 
default choice for participant-directed retirement plans. The balanced fund, despite being far 
less popular as a default investment choice, outperforms the lifecycle fund for all thresholds, 
and at every level of risk aversion. With increasing thresholds, the ranking of the dynamic 
fund improves progressively outperforming the money market, lifecycle, and balanced funds. 
We find the dominance of the dynamic funds over all funds to be persistent for all threshold 
values of K > $748,270 although we do not report the results beyond K= $900,000 here.7 
Again, these results are robust for different levels of risk aversion and loss aversion. 
 When the participant is not concerned about a minimum threshold level of wealth for 
sustenance, K = 0 and the loss aversion parameter becomes irrelevant as W-K is always non-
negative. The participant exhibits CRRA utility over wealth as in Poterba et al (2006). In 
such a case, unlike the results under minimum threshold assumption, we find the rankings of 
the funds to be sensitive to the value of risk aversion coefficient. For γ = 2, the dynamic fund 
outperforms other funds whilst the money market fund occupies the last position. This result 
                                                 
7 We do not test for threshold values beyond $1,500,000 as those values are not what most would consider as the 
minimum required level for sustenance 
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is expected as an investor with very low risk aversion would find the risk associated with 
uncertain wealth outcomes tolerable given the much higher expected wealth for the dynamic 
fund. However, once the risk aversion parameter increases the dynamic fund falls behind in 
the order of preferences with the balance fund dominating other funds for γ = 3 and the 
money market fund doing so for γ ≥ 5. Interestingly, the lifecycle fund is dominated at every 
risk aversion level by one of the competing funds. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Regulatory changes subsequent to the PPA have increased the propensity of 
participant-directed retirement plans in selecting lifecycle funds as their default options. 
Whilst lifecycle funds are considered by most as superior to money-market funds from the 
retirement savings perspective, whether they are more appropriate as default options than 
other available choices has not been properly explored before. Using a utility-of-terminal 
wealth approach that penalizes retirement wealth falling below a minimum threshold for 
sustenance, we show that lifecycle funds in their current form result in outcomes that are 
inferior to those of alternative investment options considered in our paper. If workers are 
concerned about retiring with a minimum level of wealth for sustenance, a diversified 
balanced fund seems to be a superior choice to a lifecycle fund over a range of wealth 
thresholds. This is a surprising result given that the former is less favored by fiduciaries in 
US as default investment choice for their plans.8 
We do find evidence that a modified switching principle, as adopted by the dynamic 
fund in our paper, can enable lifecycle funds to significantly improve retirement outcomes. 
Conditional switching from stocks to fixed income securities based on an accumulation target 
significantly reduces the chance of retiring in poverty compared to unconditional switching 
many years prior to retirement. 
Even when we assume that employees are not concerned about a minimum threshold 
level of retirement wealth, the lifecycle fund does not emerge as the most preferred option 
among the available choices. It is dominated by the dynamic, balanced, and money market 
funds respectively for low, moderate, and high risk aversion. 
Age-based asset allocation is intuitively appealing. It sits well with the conventional 
wisdom that the ability to withstand market volatility reduces with age and decreasing 
                                                 
8 In contrast, balanced funds are the most commonly nominated default options in some countries like Australia.  
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investment horizon. However, our results imply that a purely age-based switching can be 
detrimental to workers’ retirement savings as it unconditionally trades off volatility risk 
against the more serious risk of retiring with inadequate wealth. Plan fiduciaries would do 
well to consider this issue in their choice of default options. 
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